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Catholic disaffiliation in Britain: a 
quantitative overview 
 
Abstract 
This article presents a quantitative assessment of Catholic disaffiliates - i.e., those who were 
brought up Catholic, but who now no longer identify as such - in contemporary Britain. 
Using British Social Attitudes data, it seeks to i) gauge the overall extent of Catholic 
disaffiliation, and its significance relative to the retention/disaffiliation rates of other major 
Christian groupings; ii) identify patterns in the changing rates of Catholic 
retention/disaffiliation over the course of the twentieth century; iii) analyses Catholic 
disaffiliation in terms of key demographic variables (sex and age); and iv) compares the 
current religious beliefs and prayer practices of different groups of Catholic disaffiliates and 
retainees. As will be argued throughout this article, in-depth study of Catholic disaffiliates 
sheds important new light on the sociology of Catholicism in modern Britain. Furthermore, it 
contributes to ongoing discussions of secularization, precisely as a case-study of change over 
time within a significant religious minority.  
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Introduction 
 This article presents a quantitative assessment of Catholic disaffiliates - i.e., those 
who were brought up Catholic, but who now no longer identify as such - in contemporary 
Britain. This description applies to two in five of all those raised Catholic, according to 
pooled 2007-11 data from the British Social Attitudes survey. The purpose of the present 
study is to map the main contours of the phenomenon. It will do this in four main ways. i) By 
gauging the overall extent of Catholic disaffiliation, and its significance relative to the 
retention/disaffiliation rates of other major Christian groupings. ii) By identifying patterns in 
the changing rates of Catholic retention/disaffiliation over the course of the twentieth century 
(principally using decadal birth cohorts), as a contribution to wider debates concerning the 
dating and timing of secularization. iii) By beginning the task of analysing Catholic 
disaffiliation in terms of key demographic variables (in this case, sex and age
i
), as a prelude 
to future quantitative and qualitative research looking at the causes of, and influences upon, 
disaffiliation. And iv) by comparing the current religious beliefs and prayer practices of 
different groups of Catholic disaffiliates and retainees. As will be argued throughout this 
article, in-depth study of Catholic disaffiliates sheds important new light on the sociology of 
Catholicism in modern Britain. Furthermore, it contributes to ongoing discussions of 
secularization, precisely as a case-study of change over time within a significant religious 
minority - and one in which, as numerous studies have noted, 'tribal' feelings of belonging 
have traditionally been strong (see Hornsby-Smith).  
 Religious affiliation, and its steadily increasing unpopularity over the last fifty or 
sixty years, is among the primary indicators of British secularization (alongside falling 
patterns of religious belief and religious practice). According to the 2011 British Social 
Attitudes survey, slightly over 50% of Britons now claim to have 'no religion'. Two-thirds of 
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these were, however, brought up within a religious - and in the vast majority of cases, 
Christian - tradition. This traffic is, moreover, almost all one way: only one in every fifty 
people brought up without a religious affiliation now identify as having one. Accordingly, the 
driving force of secularization in Britain (and presumably elsewhere) is chiefly to be found in 
the phenomenon variously described in recent literature as 'disaffiliation', 'deconversion', or - 
now less common - 'apostasy' (see Cragun and Hammer). 
 Especially when compared to religious conversion, the dynamics of deconversion or 
disaffiliation have received little sociological attention. Notable exceptions here, however, 
are several qualitative studies of disaffiliates (e.g., Francis and Richter; Zuckerman), and - 
most germane to the present study - recent quantitative work disentangling period and cohort 
effects, and gauging the influence of parental religiosity on intergenerational religious 
transmission (Crockett and Voas; Bruce and Glendinning ; Schwadel; Voas and Storm). Also 
relevant is the growing body of research, both qualitative and quantitative, which directly 
focuses on the self-ascribing nonreligious, especially in Britain and USA (Kosmin et al.; 
Voas and McAndrew; Lee). Whereas earlier scholarship tended to dismiss none, no religion, 
and nonreligious as merely residual 'catch all' labels, artificially created by survey researchers 
(see Vernon; Hout and Fischer; Pasquale), newer studies have emphasized that these are often 
meaningful self-descriptions which are adopted 'proactively' (Lee; see also Bullivant, 
'Indifferent'). Also noteworthy is the evidence from American datasets that the nones 
constitute a fluid and heterogeneous population, comprising multiple subgroups. Plausibly, at 
least some of this diversity may be ascribed to the differing religious backgrounds towards 
which many nones still retain at least some attachment (see Baker and Smith; Lim et al.). 
Thus in a new twist to the old joke about Northern Irish atheists, it seems that it might make 
sense, in generalized demographic and attitudinal terms, to speak of '(formerly) Jewish 
nones', '(formerly) Evangelical Protestant nones', or '(formerly) Catholic nones'.  
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 It is the latter group, across Britain as a whole, who form a primary focus of the 
present article. For over a quarter of a century, sociological studies of Catholicism in Britain 
have found that significant numbers of those brought up Catholic come, as adults, no longer 
to identify as such (Hornsby-Smith 50-1). Such disaffiliation may be viewed as the extreme 
case of the far broader and well-documented phenomenon of lapsation: that is, 'cradle 
Catholics' in later life falling away (or 'lapsing') from normative levels of Catholic practice or 
belief, while - in most cases - retaining some sense of 'belonging'.
ii
 In Britain, as in many 
other western nations, lapsation is recognized as a dominant feature of the Catholic 
landscape. Official Church materials, for example, speak of there being 'approximately four 
million' lapsed Catholics in England and Wales alone (Catholic Bishops' Conference of 
England and Wales).
iii
 What proportion of them no longer even identify as Catholics is 
neither stated nor asked, however: in Britain disaffiliation has not yet received special 
attention in its own right. In America, the situation is slightly different. Perhaps stirred by 
statistical evidence suggesting that 'former Catholics' account for a high proportion of the 
rapidly growing 'none' population (Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate; Kosmin et 
al.), a number of historians and theologians have begun investigating disaffiliation 
specifically as 'one of the most theologically significant phenomena in contemporary 
American Roman Catholic life' (Hornbeck 1; see also Beaudoin). These American pioneers, 
moreover, can claim to have sympathizers in high places. As Pope Francis noted recently: 'It 
is undeniable that many people feel disillusioned and no longer identify with the Catholic 
tradition' (art. 70).  
 
Data and methods  
 Each year the British Social Attitudes survey, administered by NatCen Social 
Research, conducts face-to-face interviews with over 3000 British adults, selected by random 
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probability sampling. Waves have run each year since 1983, except in 1988 and 1992. 
Among a wide range of demographic and attitudinal questions, the survey includes a select 
number of items relating to religious identity, belief, and practice. In certain years, a more 
detailed religion module has been administered to a subset of the respondents. The most 
recent of these was in 2008, which incorporated the International Social Survey Programme 
'Religion III' module. 
 Since 1991, the BSA has asked respondents both (i) 'In what religion, if any, were you 
brought up?' and (ii) 'Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?'. (The 
latter question has been a feature of the survey since 1983.) The main analyses in this article 
are based upon a cross-tabulation of these two variables. It thus becomes possible to track the 
proportion of 'cradle' affiliates that each denomination
iv
 retains into adulthood (i.e., those who 
were brought up as X, and still identify as X), as well as the current (non)religious affiliations 
of those who have disaffiliated from their religion of upbringing (i.e., those who brought up 
as X, but now identify as Y or Z). It is equally possible, of course, to identify the proportions 
of 'converts' (i.e., all those not raised as X, who now identify as X) that each denomination 
has attracted. The data do not, however, reveal 'multiple switchers': those who have changed 
religious affiliation more than once, or those who, having left their religious of upbringing for 
a period of time, have now returned (though see Eccles). 
 For the purposes of the present study, therefore, a Catholic retainee is any respondent 
who answers 'Catholic' to question (i) on upbringing, and 'Catholic' to question (ii) on current 
affiliation. Conversely, a Catholic disaffiliate (our main focus here) is any respondent who 
answers 'Catholic' to question (i), and something else to question (ii). In some of the later 
analyses, the disaffiliates are further divided into two distinct subgroups: those who have 
switched to a different religious affiliation [Switchers], and those who now identify as having 
no religion [Leavers]. More will be said about these designations below.) A Catholic convert, 
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meanwhile, is any respondent who answers 'Catholic' to question (ii) on current affiliation, 
and something else to question (i) on upbringing. On occasion, these labels will be applied, 
mutatis mutandis, to disaffiliates and converts of other denominations also. 
 Most analyses presented in this paper rely on data from five recent waves of the BSA: 
2007 to 2011 (inclusive). These waves were pooled in order to produce a decent sample size 
(e.g., including c. 2500 cradle Catholics). As background information, the 2007-11 dataset as 
a whole yielded 18 639 subjects; 45.6% male to 54.4% female; mean age 48.7, with a 
standard deviation of 17.8. The cradle Catholic subsample, our primary focus for analysis, 
make up 13.4% of this total. This comprises 2486 subjects; 42.2% male to 57.8% female; 
mean age 46.7, with a standard deviation of 16.8. 
 Significantly, the 2007-11 dataset includes the more detailed religion-related items 
administered to a subset of respondents in the 2008 wave (these form the basis of the below 
analysis of religious beliefs and prayer practices). In order to measure historical rates of 
retention and disaffiliation over time, however, data were used from twenty waves (1991-
2011, excluding 1992). This is because the relevant question regarding upbringing was only 
asked from 1991 onwards.  
 
Results and discussion 
1. Contemporary Catholic disaffiliation in context 
[Table I here] 
 Table I presents the retention rates of mainstream British Christian denominations, 
alongside the proportions, and 'destinations', of those who have disaffiliated away from them. 
The table's penultimate column compares each denomination's total numbers of disaffiliates, 
with the total numbers of 'converts' or new affiliates (i.e., all those not raised as X, who now 
identify as X) in the dataset. The figure given represents the numbers of new affiliates a 
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denomination has attracted, for every one it has failed to retain. For comparative purposes, 
the equivalent figures are given for the 'No religion' category at the foot of the table (though 
this should not be taken to imply that 'No religion' is being conceived here as being itself a 
kind of religion or religious denomination, to which new affiliates have 'converted', etc.).  
 In general terms, and not surprisingly, the data support the overwhelming testimony 
of other studies: that large numbers of British Christians leave the denominations they were 
brought up in; that only relatively few of these disaffiliates switch to other religious 
affiliations, whether Christian or otherwise; and that, therefore, the 'No religion' category 
continues to grow apace (Brown; Voas and Crockett; Crocket and Voas; Bruce, 
Secularization). The inclusion of the 'No religion' category alongside the major 
denominations illustrates this very clearly. In stark contrast to British Christians, the vast 
majority of born-and-raised nones remain such. Furthermore, the numbers of 'new nones' - 
one is tempted to call them nonverts - outstrip the few cradle nones who do find religion by 
around 25 to 1. 
 However, the data clearly show that, within the general trend of high levels of 
Christian disaffiliation, there is a marked degree of denominational variation. On this 
measure at least, 'Anglican secularization' has a noticeably different texture to 'Catholic 
secularization', and both differ markedly from Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, or 'non-
denominational' varieties. 
 At 62%, the Catholic Church's retention rate is the strongest of the main British 
denominations. Nearly three out of every five cradle Catholics retain their affiliation, 
compared to roughly one in two of those raised Anglican, Presbyterian, or 'non-denom', and 
only one in three raised Baptist or Methodist. This fact alone might justify a more detailed 
investigation of Catholic retention: why is Catholic identity transmitted more reliably than 
that of any other British denomination? While the bulk of that subject is outside the proper 
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scope of the present study, a more detailed, decade-by-decade breakdown of Catholic 
retention will be presented and discussed in the following section. 
 It would, however, almost certainly be a mistake to dwell exclusively on the relative 
strength of Catholic retention. After all, a retention rate of 62% equals a disaffiliation rate of 
38%. Furthermore, we will later see that a large proportion of those who do retain a Catholic 
identity rarely or never practise their faith, and that a significant minority are atheists or 
agnostics. The Catholic birthrate would need to be vastly higher than the national average - 
which it is not - to approach the rate of replacement. The slight decline in the proportion of 
Catholics within the British population over the last quarter-century (10.5% in the pooled 
1983-7 BSA dataset; 9.0% in 2007-11) would, therefore, be much larger if not for 
immigration.  
 Especially in England, the idea of the 'Catholic convert' holds a strong resonance 
(Hornsby-Smith 23-4). From the nineteenth century onwards, many of the Church's most 
prominent members have been converts: Newman and Manning, Chesterton and Greene, 
Widdecombe and Blair. In addition, much media attention has been given to disaffected 
Anglicans joining the Church over the past two decades (following the General Synod's 
decision to ordain women in 1993, and in light of Pope Benedict XVI's creation of the 
'Personal Ordinariate of Our Lady of Walsingham' in 2011). Despite this, Table I shows that 
conversions to Catholicism are dwarfed, by a ratio of one to ten, by disaffiliations away from 
it (either to another religious tradition, or - in most cases - to no religion). This ratio is about 
equal to that found in the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches.  
 [Table II here] 
 A breakdown of conversion rates among the major Christian groups is given in Table 
II, with 'No religion' again included for comparison. Once again, there are striking 
denominational differences: less than 1 in 10 Catholics, Anglicans, or Presbyterians are 
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converts, compared to 2 in 10 Methodists, and over 3 in 10 Baptists or non-denoms. Notably, 
former nones compose only around 1% to 6% of any denomination's current affiliates, and no 
Christian group attracts more than a handful of those brought up in non-Christian religions. 
That is to say, the overwhelming majority of converts to a given Christian group are already 
brought up within a (different) Christian group. The Catholic Church is a case in point. While 
7.2% of currently affiliating Catholics in the 2007-11 data are converts, only 1 in 10 of these 
(i.e., 0.8% of all Catholics) were brought up as nones, and not a single one was raised in a 
non-Christian religion. It is perhaps worth noting that, theoretically, it is possible for every 
Christian group to report high rates of conversion (due to a significant minority switching 
between denominations), while overall Christian numbers continue to decline (due to large 
numbers of born-and-raised Christians becoming nones, and only small numbers of people 
converting from a non-Christian background). Feasibly, this kind of model would allow 
localized instances of 'church growth' (see Goodhew) to be comprehended within, and not as 
a challenge to, the secularization paradigm. 
 
2. Catholic disaffiliation through the decades 
 
[Table III here] 
  
 Table III breaks down Catholic retention and disaffiliation by birth decade throughout 
most of the twentieth century, based on pooled data collected between 1991 and 2011. In 
order to allow fair comparisons between decades, only responses from those aged 30+ at the 
time they were surveyed have been included. This is based on the assumption that most 
people who leave the religious affiliation of their upbringing do so in their late-teens or 
twenties (Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate 6-7). If so, then the retention rates of 
later decadal cohorts, which include larger proportions of respondents under 30, would be 
inflated by the inclusion of significant numbers who perhaps have not yet disaffiliated. 
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 In broad terms, the data show stronger rates of retention within earlier cohorts than in 
later ones. The four pre-1945 cohorts, for example, have a mean retention rate of 74.8%, 
compared to 59.8% for the four post-1945 cohorts - a fall of 15 percentage points. The 
proportion of born-and-raised Catholics adopting another religious affiliation has remained 
relatively steady throughout the whole period (mean = 5.9%; standard deviation = 0.9). As 
such, the falling retention rate is due overwhelmingly to the growing popularity of 'no 
religion'. However, while previous studies of British denominations have suggested a steady 
decline in retention from the earliest to the most recent cohorts (King-Hele 184), the Catholic 
data show a somewhat different pattern, with particular 'lows' in the 1955-64 and 1965-74 
brackets, followed by an apparent recovery (though still far below pre-war levels) in the next 
decade 
 Three things, in particular, are noteworthy here. 
 First of all, disaffiliation is by no means a new, or even post-war, phenomenon in 
British Catholicism (see Hornsby-Smith 63-4; Wadsworth and Freeman). Even at the 'high 
point' of Catholic retention - i.e., the 1915-24 cohort - over one in five of those raised 
Catholics came no longer to identify as such (although the data do not tell us when), and only 
a quarter of those adopted a different religious affiliation. Within two decades - the 1935-44 
cohort - the disaffiliation rate had risen to three in ten, with all but a sixth of those identifying 
as having no religion. 
 Secondly, there is a clear watershed between cohorts born pre- and post-1945, with 
the former having retention rates in the 70s, and the latter in the low 60s or high 50s. The 
largest decade-by-decade change occurs, moreover, between the 1935-44 and 1945-54 
cohorts, with a fall of 9 percentage points. The 1945-54 cohort then sets a new pattern 
followed (albeit with some noteworthy variations) by subsequent decadal cohorts. This post-
1945 shift can be seen more clearly in Chart I, which further breaks down the retention rate 
11 
 
by birth year. Even accounting for a considerable degree of yearly fluctuation, the years 1945 
and 1946 appear to mark a genuine transition. 
[Chart I here] 
 In the wider context of British secularization, much has been written about this 
immediate post-war 'Baby Boomer' generation, which came of age between the mid-1960s 
and early-1970s. According to several scholars, primarily social historians, it is the latter fact 
that is most significant. Most famously, Callum Brown has argued that the sixties' sexual 
revolution, leading to a radical redefinition of traditional British gender roles and attitudes, 
‘entirely destroyed [British Christianity's] house of cards’ (180). Alternatively, Hugh 
McLeod, incorporating Brown's and others' arguments into a more wide-ranging analysis, 
contends that the religious ferment of the late-sixties 'may come to be seen as marking a 
rupture as profound as that brought by the Reformation' (1). Recently, Steve Bruce has 
challenged this kind of approach, arguing that the Baby Boomers' low levels of religiosity 
compared to previous generations are due instead to their parents' (and especially their 
mothers') experiences during World War Two: it is not that they became less religious in the 
sixties, but that they had been brought up less religiously in the forties and fifties 
(Secularization; see also Bruce and Glendinning).  
 As it stands, the data here offer no adjudication on these matters: they simply add 
(even more) confirmation that 'something happened' in connection with the 1945-54 cohort, 
expressed here in terms of Catholic retention and disaffiliation specifically. (This may simply 
have been an intensification of the same processes leading to disaffiliation within the pre-
1945 cohorts, which was, as we have seen, already significant.) That said, in a study 
concentrating on the Catholic Church, some attention must be given to the Second Vatican 
Council (1962-5) and its aftermath - including, for example, the wide-ranging liturgical 
changes, and Pope Paul VI's reaffirmation of the traditional teaching on sexual ethics in 
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1968's Humanae Vitae. These events fall squarely in the periods covered by Brown and 
McLeod (the latter especially gives them considerable attention), and there is a growing body 
of literature recounting both the hopes and anxieties with which they were met on the ground 
in Britain and elsewhere (e.g., Massa; Harris; Corrin; McDannell). Vatican II has been 
described as the 'biggest meeting in the history of the world' (O'Malley 10), and given the 
extent of its liturgical, pastoral, and doctrinal reforms, it seems unlikely that it would have no 
effect whatsoever on the retention (or not) of those Catholics who came of age either during 
or after it. Even if the relatively high level of disaffiliation within the 1945-54 cohort had 
already largely been 'set' by earlier (perhaps parental) factors, one might expect subsequent 
birth cohorts, brought up wholly or in part in the postconciliar Catholic world, to have been 
affected in some significant way. This too, however, cannot be established from the present 
data.  
 
3. Sex and Age 
[Table IV here] 
 To aid the analysis in this and the following sections, the contemporary sample (i.e., 
all those giving Catholic as their religion of upbringing in the pooled 2007-11 dataset) has 
been divided into four categories, on the assumption that these represent distinctive 
subgroups. (Please see Table IV.) Most obviously, the disaffiliates have been divided into 
'Leavers' (i.e., those who now claim no religious affiliation) and 'Switchers' (i.e., those who 
have adopted a non-Catholic religious identification). Due to the small percentages involved - 
see Table I - the Switchers category combines both members of (non-Catholic) Christian 
denominations and non-Christian religions. Meanwhile, those retaining their Catholic 
affiliation have been divided by frequency of religious practice: 'Regular practisers' who 
attend church once a month or more, and 'Low/non-practisers' who attend less than monthly. 
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This division, which splits the Catholic retainees more or less in half (see Table IV), is based 
on two theoretical and empirical assumptions: i) that practice is the most significant indicator 
of religiosity (cf. Voas and Crockett, 14; Bruce, Modern World, 34), thus one might expect to 
see notable differences between Catholics who are or are not regular practisers; and ii) that 
low/non-practising affiliates (sometimes described to as 'nominal' adherents or the 'fuzzy 
faithful') are a transitional group between practising affiliates and Leavers (cf. Voas and 
Crockett; Voas; Lim et al.). There is, of course, a slight caveat to be raised here, since these 
differing levels of practice are based on self-reports in the BSA dataset. (The same is true for 
the data on prayer, discussed in section 4 below.) As is well-known,  there exists a formidable 
body of research questioning the reliability of such measures, based on comparisons with 
both actual attendence counts and evidence from time-use surveys (Hadaway et al.; Presser 
and Stinson; Brenner, 'Exceptional Behavior'), some of it Catholic-specific (Chaves and 
Cavendish). Substantial over-reporting has, however, been most clearly demonstrated in the 
USA; evidence for the effect in Britain and the rest of Europe is substantially weaker (see 
Brenner, 'Exceptional Behavior'; Brenner, 'Investgating the Effect'). Hence these concerns, 
while important to bear in mind, are not considered to undermine the use of self-reports 
herein. 
 It should be noted that the boundary between 'regular' and less/non' practice here is 
somewhat arbitrary, albeit one that is commonly used within the sociology of religion. 
Needless to say, each category masks a good degree of internal difference. 66.3% of Regular 
practisers, for instance, attend church once a week or more: this equates to 18.2% of all those 
raised Catholic, and 29.4% of retainees as a whole. These proportions are noteworthy, since 
weekly attendance (at Sunday Mass) is the Catholic Church's own formal measure of a 
'practising Catholic'. Likewise, whereas 54.7% of Low/non-practisers attend church 'never or 
practically never' (equal to 30.5% of all retainees), 24.7% of them attend 'less often than 
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monthly, but at least twice a year'. Incidentally, 2.7% of Leavers, and fully 45.4% of 
Switchers, would also count as regular practisers on the above criteria.
v
 
[Table V here] 
 Table V and Chart II show the relationships between sex and our four categories. In 
general terms, these confirm the overwhelming testimony of other studies regarding the 
positive correlation between women and religiosity (e.g., Trzebiatowska and Bruce 1-23), 
and - more particularly - of the preponderance of men among religious nones (Kosmin et al.; 
PEW Forum). Beyond these, a number of specific points in the data are worthy of brief 
comment.  
 Firstly, if we compare Table V's Total row with the sex breakdown of the 2007-11 
dataset as a whole (i.e., 45.6% male to 54.4% female; see 'Data and Methods' section above), 
it would appear that women are more likely than men to report having been brought up as a 
Catholic in the first place. This curious fact, which occurs in other Christian denominations 
also, admits of several possible explanations. It may be that girls are more likely to be raised 
religiously than are boys (cf. Voas and McAndrew). Conversely, women may be more 
inclined than men to interpret an ambiguous upbringing (i.e., one that was neither particularly 
religious, nor conspicuously nonreligious) as having been 'religious' rather than not. 
 Secondly, men are one and a half times as likely as women to become disaffiliates of 
either kind: 46.9% of men raised Catholic now no longer identify as such, compared to 31.8% 
of women. While only a minority of disaffiliates from both sexes have adopted a different 
religious affiliation, there is an evident gender difference here also. 23.2% of female 
disaffiliates, but only 12.3% of male disaffiliates, now affirm another (i.e., non-Catholic) 
religious identity, meaning that women are almost twice as likely to do so. The greatest 
divergence between the sexes thus occurs in the 'no religion' category, which accounts for 
two-fifths of all men, but a quarter of all women (see Chart II). 
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[Chart II here] 
 Thirdly, among those who have retained a Catholic identity, regular practice is 
markedly more prevalent among women. As is displayed in Chart II, just under a third of 
born-and-raised Catholic women attend church monthly or more, compared to around a fifth 
of men. This effect, amplified by the fact that more women identify as having been raised 
Catholic in the first place, can be most clearly seen in Table V: over two-thirds of Regular 
practisers are female. This disparity is much less evident among the Low/non-practisers, who 
account for roughly a third of men and women alike. 
[Chart III here] 
 Chart III breaks down our four categories by age group. As one would expect from 
the earlier cohort analysis (see Chart I), disaffiliates are most prevalent among respondents in 
their forties (with corresponding birth years from the late 1950s to the early 1970s). 
Interestingly, we see that the proportions of Low/non-practisers are fairly consistently across 
this and all older age groups (all within a couple of percent in the low 30s). The real 
differences come in the proportion of Regular practisers: 37.3% of the over 70s, 34% of the 
60-69s, 28.1% of 50-59s, and just 23.3% of the 40-49s. This lower proportion then holds 
fairly consistently among the 30-39s (24.7%) and the under 30s (23.8%). The recovery in 
Catholic retention evident among the younger age groups - also noted in the above cohort 
analysis - is thus almost wholly composed of higher numbers of Low/non-practisers.  
 It is of course possible that this 'recovery' is only apparent, and is the result of the 
under-40s cohorts not yet having had time to reach their full 'disaffiliation potential'. Based 
on previous studies, one might reasonably expect a sizable number of those surveyed in their 
late-teens and early twenties to become Leavers or Switchers at a later time (see Center for 
Applied Research in the Apostolate 6-7). That said, previous British research offers strong 
arguments against the existence of notable age or period effects on religious identification, at 
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least among the over-30s. Crockett and Voas' much-cited analysis of both British Household 
Panel Survey and BSA data, for instance, found 'an absence of any period or age effects over 
and above the generational differences' (571; cf. Schwadel for an analysis of US data).  
 Irrespective of the permanence of the effect, it is worth underlining the fact that it is 
not those in their late-teens, 20s and 30s, but is instead those in and around their 40s, who are 
most alienated, in terms of both affiliation and practice, from their cradle Catholicism. This 
finding runs counter to a great deal of received wisdom within Catholic pastoral circles.  
 
4. Religious beliefs and prayer 
 The wisdom of dividing Catholic disaffiliates into two separate groups, however 
cumbersome in other respects, becomes clear as we turn now to religious beliefs and 
opinions, and frequency of prayer. Those who leave Catholicism in order to join another 
denomination or religious tradition are a distinct type of disaffiliate from those who now 
claim no religious affiliation whatsoever. As we shall see, in this area, Switchers have more 
in common with Regular practisers than they do with either Leavers or Low/non-practisers. 
 
[Table VI here] 
 
 Unsurprisingly, Leavers score relatively low on God belief, with over half giving a 
fairly straightforwardly atheistic ('don't believe in God') or agnostic ('don't know') response 
(although note that almost one-fifth of Low/non-practisers did likewise). Nevertheless, over a 
fifth of Leavers affirm one of the two strongest theistic categories. This is not necessarily 
surprising since, as sociologists have been pointing out for almost fifty years, being 
religiously unaffiliated is not the same thing as being an atheist or agnostic (e.g., Vernon; 
Bullivant, 'Sociology'; Kosmin et al.). However on this point, former Catholic nones differ 
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from British nones-in-general - only around 10% of whom either 'know God really exists' or 
'feel that [they] do believe in God'. 
 Almost three quarters of Switchers affirmed one of the two strongest theistic 
categories - a proportion closer to the Regular practisers' four-fifths than it is to the Low/non-
practisers' half. Also like the Regulars, none of the Switchers claimed not to believe in God, 
and only around one in twenty expressed agnosticism (again, much nearer to the Regulars' 
none, than to the Low/non-practisers' one in five). Switchers do differ from Regular 
practisers, however, in the proportion of those affirming a 'Higher power of some kind' but 
not a 'personal God': 13.6% compared to the Regulars' 3.6%, a proportion much closer to 
both the Low/non-practisers (10.8%) and the Leavers (16.3%). 
 
[Table VII here] 
 
 Table VII summarizes responses given to a range of basic theological questions, 
showing the proportion of each category who affirmed them (regardless of the 'strength' of 
affirmation). It is not necessary to discuss each item in detail, but similar patterns to the ones 
identified above emerged here also. That is to say, Leavers are not uniformly atheists or 
metaphysical naturalists: over two-fifths affirm some manner of life after death, almost a 
third believe in a heaven, and just under a fifth believe in hell, religious miracles, and that 
God is personally concerned with every human being. Likewise, Switchers appear largely to 
have done so from religious conviction: as a group, they are notably more affirming of fairly 
classic Christian ideas than are Low/non-practising Catholics, and - albeit with some notable 
variation - tend to be nearer to the Regular practisers (e.g., regarding life after death, 
miracles, God's concern for humans, and life being meaningful only if God exists). 
 
[Table VIII here] 
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 Prayer frequency (see Table VIII) is an especially interesting measure, since it 
captures practice - time spent actually doing something - instead of simply gauging opinions, 
which may or may not have any significance in the lives of respondents. As expected, 
Leavers tend to pray little, with two-thirds never doing it. Even so, slightly over one in ten 
prays on a monthly or more basis. Arguably the most prayerful group, at least in terms of 
praying once a week or more, are the Switchers, two-thirds of whom fit this category, slightly 
ahead of Regular practisers (albeit based on a relatively small sample size). This is over three 
times the proportion of Low/non-practisers who do so. Again, the implication is clear: those 
who disaffiliate in order to adopt another religious identity do not typically seem to do so out 
of indifference, or by default. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 The above analysis is intended to shed initial light on arguably the single most 
striking social trend within British Catholicism over the past century: an unprecedented 'Mass 
exodus', in more than one sense of the phrase. Moreover, this paper has foregrounded 
disaffiliation as a discrete topic in its own right, properly distinct from the related, though 
much broader (and also under-researched, if less so), phenomenon of lapsation or non-
practice. The main, quantitative contours of contemporary Catholic disaffiliation in Britain 
have been sketched: its extent both in absolute terms, and relative to other mainstream 
Christian denominations, as well as to earlier decades of Catholic history; notable differences 
according to key demographic variables of sex and age; and more tentatively, the continuing 
connections, or not, of disaffiliates to certain religious beliefs and practices. Where relevant, 
these findings have been linked to three lively though largely (and regrettably) independent 
sets of research literature: that charting the changing (mis)fortunes of the Catholic Church 
within the West, especially in the wake of Vatican II; that debating the meaning, nature, 
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extent and timing of secularization-in-general; and that focusing on the large and growing 
numbers of 'nones', especially in Britain and the USA.  
 To strike the traditional final note of exploratory articles such as these: there is a great 
deal more work to be done in this area. Hitherto much of the research into the waning of 
religious belief, practice, and affiliation has focused either on the very large, macro level 
(e.g., broad societal trends, typically collapsing 'mainline denominations' into a single graph 
line), or on the very small, micro (e.g., individual deconversion narratives, or the 
psychological characteristics of religious deconverts). While both are important and 
necessary, largely missing has been sustained sociological attention on how both play out, 
concretely, within the specific histories of individual religious denominations and 
communities. The data presented above - not least the notable differences in disaffiliation and 
conversion rates among the denominations - make a prima facie case for exploring further 
how largescale secularizing trends have been (and are being) mediated differently within 
different British Christian groupings. Accordingly, the bulk of this paper is intended as a first 
step towards doing just that for one of them.  
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i
 This choice has been made on the basis of these two variables  being the most widely discussed within both 
scholarly treatments of secularization (relevant aspects of which will be referred to in the course of the 'Results 
and discussion' section), as well as in more popular treatments of Catholic decline in particular. Alongside these 
two, and for similar reasons, I would ideally like to have explored the influence of immigration on British 
Catholic affiliation and practice, with specific breakdowns of  both origin (Ireland, Poland, Philippines, etc.) and 
generational status ('first,' 'second', and 'third generation' etc.) . Unfortunately, however, the BSA does not ask 
the necessary questions. Naturally, there are other, potentially significant demographic issues to be explored in 
connection with this overall topic (class, education, etc.). These will have to wait for future studies. 
ii
 'Lapsed' and its cognates are sometimes criticized or avoided for their allegedly pejorative overtones (see 
Hornbeck 8-9). Apparently less judgmental-sounding terms, such as 'non-practising', 'non-churchgoing', 
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'inactive', or even 'resting' have been suggested as replacements, though none has yet been widely adopted. 
Since lapsation is the traditional phraseology within the sociology of religion, I retain it here with the disclaimer 
that no pejorative sense is intended.  
iii
 For interesting but irrelevant reasons, the Catholic Church in Britain is divided administratively between 
'England and Wales' and 'Scotland' (Northern Ireland, meanwhile, comes under 'Ireland'). The data presented in 
this paper, however, relate to Britain as a whole. 
iv
 'Denomination' is used here in a non-technical sense, as a short-hand for as a common, generic grouping of 
Christians (e.g., Roman Catholic, Church of England/Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, etc.). Obviously, the 
inclusion of 'Christian - no denomination' as a denomination even in this sense is problematic. This is especially 
so since those selecting this category likely include representatives from a very large and varied collection of 
Christian groups. However, given the significant size of the grouping (it was the third most popular affiliation in 
the BSA 2007-11 data, after 'No religion' and 'Church of England/Anglican'), along with US research suggesting 
that 'non-denom' is often a meaningful self-description, it is included here as a category in its own right. 
v
 Due to the precise wording of the BSA question ('Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals and 
baptisms, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?') we may 
assume here that the practising Leavers are attending Catholic services, while the Switchers are attending 
meetings or services connected with their new denomination/religion. 
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Table I: Retention and disaffiliation rates of major British Christian 
groupings, and 'No religion', 2007-11 
Data source: BSA 2007-2011. Weighted data ('GenWt'), based on 18 512 valid cases. Only selected categories 
shown. *Row does not equal 100% due to 'Same as as raised in' and 'No religion' being equivalents. 
. 
  
 
Current affiliation... 
 
 
Raised as... 
Same as 
raised in 
(%) 
(Other) 
Christian 
group (%) 
 
Non-
Christian 
religion (%) 
No 
religion 
(%) 
Number of 
'converts' 
per 
disaffiliate 
 
 
N 
Roman Catholic 62.0 6.0 0.6 31.4 0.1 2484 
Church of 
England/Anglican 
52.1 6.8 0.6 40.5 0.1 7267 
Presbyterian/Church 
of Scotland 
51.5 9.6 0.4 38.5 0.1 908 
Christian - no 
denomination 
48.3 3.6 1.3 46.8 0.5 2453 
Baptist 36.4 28.8 0.1 34.7 0.3 216 
Methodist 33.7 26.2 0.8 39.3 0.1 723 
No religion* 92.4 6.8 0.8 92.4 25.7 2980 
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Table II: Conversion rates of major British Christian groupings, and 'No 
religion', 2007-11 
Data source: BSA 2007-2011. Weighted data ('GenWt'), based on 18 512 valid cases. Only selected categories 
shown. *Row does not equal 100% due to 'Same as current' and 'No religion' being equivalents. 
 
  
 
Raised as...  
Current affiliation... 
Same as 
current 
(%) 
(Other) 
Christian group 
(%) 
Non-Christian 
religion (%) 
No religion 
(%) 
 
 
N 
Roman Catholic 92.8 6.4 0.0 0.8 1659 
Church of 
England/Anglican 
91.5 6.6 0.1 1.8 4139 
Presbyterian/Church 
of Scotland 
93.0 5.6 0.0 1.4 503 
Christian - no 
denomination 
66.4 29.1 0.2 4.3 1785 
Baptist 62.7 31.7 0.0 5.6 126 
Methodist 80.3 18.7 0.0 1.0 304 
No religion* 32.1 66.6 1.3 32.1 8586 
25 
 
Table III: Retention and disaffiliation rates of those raised Catholic by 
decade of birth, 1991-2011  
Data source: BSA 1991-2011. Weighted data ('GenWt') based on 7 733 valid cases. Only respondents aged 30 
or over at time of survey included. 1885-1904 birth cohort removed due to very low number of cases. Decade 
boundaries selected for ease of identifying post-WW2 (i.e., 1945-1954) cohort. 
 
  
 
Current religious affiliation (time of survey)...   
Decade of 
birth 
Catholic 
(%) 
Other 
Christian 
group (%) 
Non-
Christian 
religion (%) 
No 
religion 
(%) 
No. of 
converts per 
disaffiliate 
 
 
N 
1905-14 76.2 6.0 1.2 16.7 0.5 84 
1915-24 78.3 5.6 0.0 16.0 0.5 374 
1925-34 74.2 5.0 0.2 20.6 0.4 863 
1935-44 70.3 5.4 0.3 24.0 0.3 1173 
1945-54 61.3 6.3 0.9 31.4 0.2 1692 
1955-64 57.3 5.7 0.5 36.4 0.1 2055 
1965-74 57.5 5.7 1.0 35.8 0.1 1233 
1975-84 62.9 3.5 0.0 33.6 0.1 259 
MEAN 67.3 5.4 0.5 26.8 0.3 - 
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Table IV: Fourfold categorization of those brought up Catholic based on 
current affiliation and/or religious practice, 2007-11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: BSA 2007-2011. Weighted data ('GenWt'), based on 2476 valid cases. 
 
 
 
N  
RETAINEES 
(= raised Catholic, still 
identify as such) 
Regular practisers 
(= attend church monthly or more) 
 
679 (27.4%) 
Low/non-practisers 
(= attend church less than monthly) 
 
852 (34.4%) 
DISAFFILIATES 
(= raised Catholic, no 
longer identify as such) 
Leavers 
(= no religion) 
 
350 (31.5%) 
Switchers 
(= other religious identification) 
 
106 (6.7%) 
 
 
2476 (100%) 
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Table V: Sex of those brought up Catholic, by current religious affiliation 
and/or practice, 2007-11 
Data source: BSA 2007-2011. Weighted data ('GenWt'), based on 2476 valid cases. Regular practice = attends 
church once a month or more; low/no practice = attends church less than once a month (including 'never or 
practically never'). 
  
 Category Male (%) Female (%) N 
RETAINEES 
Regular practisers 218 (32.1) 461 (67.9) 679 
Low/non-practisers 336 (39.4) 516 (60.6) 852 
DISAFFILIATES 
Leavers 429 (55.1) 350 (44.9) 779 
Switchers 60 (36.1) 106 (63.9) 166 
 TOTAL 1043 (42.1) 1433 (57.9) 2476 
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Table VI: Levels of belief in God of those brought up Catholic, by current 
religious affiliation and/or practice (2008) 
 
Don't 
believe in 
God 
Don't 
know 
whether 
there is, 
and don't 
believe 
any way 
to find out 
Don't 
believe in 
a personal 
God, but 
believe in 
Higher 
power of 
some kind 
Find 
myself 
believing 
in God 
some of 
the time, 
but not at 
others 
While 
have 
doubts, 
feel that I 
do believe 
in God 
Know God 
really 
exists and 
have no 
doubts 
about it 
Regular practisers 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 14.5% 32.7% 49.1% 
Low/non-practisers 1.1% 17.2% 10.8% 19.4% 32.3% 19.4% 
Leavers 26.7% 30.2% 16.3% 4.7% 16.3% 5.8% 
Switchers 0.0% 4.5% 13.6% 9.1% 27.3% 45.5% 
Mean Response 9.4% 16.8% 11.3% 12.5% 26.6% 23.4% 
 
Data source: BSA 2008. Weighted data ('GenWt') based on 255 valid cases. Question only asked to A and B 
groups of respondents. 
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Table VII: Selected religious opinions of those brought up Catholic, by 
current religious affiliation and/or practice (2008) 
 
Data source: BSA 2008. Weighted data ('NewWt') based on 240-250 valid cases, depending on which question 
asked. Questions only asked to A and B groups of respondents. * Those answering either 'Yes, definitely' or 
'Yes, probably'. ^ Those answering either 'Strongly agree' or 'Agree'. 
  
 
Belief in/that... 
Life 
after 
Death?* Heaven?* Hell?* 
Religious 
miracles?
* 
God 
personally 
concerns self 
with every 
human?^ 
Life only 
meaningful 
because 
God 
exists?^ 
Regular practisers 74.5% 86.5% 63.7% 86.0% 76.3% 42.0% 
Low/non-practisers 61.2% 59.1% 49.5% 52.2% 36.3% 14.9% 
Leavers 43.6% 29.1% 18.9% 19.3% 17.7% 4.8% 
Switchers 72.7% 66.6% 35.0% 75.0% 61.9% 52.0% 
Mean Response 58.6% 55.8% 40.4% 49.8% 41.0% 20.3% 
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Table VIII: Prayer frequency of those brought up Catholic, by current 
religious affiliation and/or practice (2008) 
 
Data source: BSA 2008. Weighted data ('NewWt') based on 251 valid cases. Question only asked to A and B 
groups of respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once a 
week or 
more 
At least 
monthly, 
but less 
than weekly 
Less than 
monthly, 
but at least 
once a year 
Sometimes, 
but less 
than yearly Never 
Regular practisers 64.2% 17.0% 13.2% 0.0% 5.7% 
Low/non-practisers 21.1% 18.9% 26.6% 12.2% 22.2% 
Leavers 4.8% 8.3% 11.9% 8.3% 66.7% 
Switchers 66.7% 14.3% 9.5% 0.0% 9.5% 
Mean Response 28.6% 14.5% 16.9% 7.3% 32.7% 
